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IN THE COURT APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE MERIDIAN SCHOOL,
Case No. 940074-CA

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Priority 15

vs.
BONITA HUGHES,
Defendant-Appellee.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in the Utah Court of Appeals is conferred by virtue of Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DETERMINATIVE RULE
The Rule which is believed to be determinative in this case is Rule 56 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hughes executed a private school enrollment contact with Meridian on or about February
8, 1991. (R. 113).
Sometime thereafter, Hughes determined not to enroll her child in school. (R. 108).
In a telephone conversation on or about July 29, 1991, the school registrar, Gayle Wells,
advised Hughes to write to the school board in order to request permission to withdraw from the
school. (R. 71).
1

Hughes sent a written request to withdraw on or about July 31, 1991. (R. 108)
Meridian's board of trustees met and considered Hughes request on or about August 22,
1991. (R. 106)
Meridian's school year started on September 4, 1991. (R. 95, and R. 92).
On October 2, 1991, Meridian's board of trustees notified the Defendant that her request
to withdraw from school had been rejected.
Two days later, on October 4, 1991, Hughes verbally appealed the boards decision to
Kevin Clyde. (R. 104)
The board of trustees reaffirmed its decision not to allow Hughes to withdraw her child.
(R. 97)
On October 17, 1991, Hughes offered to enroll her child in Meridian's school if Meridian
would prorate tuition for the time missed. (R. 95).
On October 24, 1991, the board of trustees rejected Hughes offer. (R. 92)
On October 28, 1991, Hughes clarified to Meridian that enrollment of her child was
conditional upon acceptance of her offer to prorate tuition. (R. 90)
Meridian, through their attorney, demanded payment of the contract amount on
November 14, 1991. (R. 88)
Meridian filed a Complaint against Hughes on April 15, 1992 (Civil No. 920-1847).
(R. 2)
By its Minute Entry dated March 24, 1993, Judge E. Patrick McGuire, Circuit Court
Judge, directed both parties to submit motions for summary judgment. (R. 53)

On January 4, 1994, the Circuit Court dismissed Meridian's Complaint. (R. 171 and
175).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's granting of Defendant Hughes Motion for Summary Judgment was not
in error as a matter of law because there were no genuine issues as to any material facts. The
only questions pointed out by Plaintiff Meridian are not genuine issues of fact, but only differing
opinions of the parties as to the legal significance of the facts. Deciding which party's legal
opinion is correct is exactly what Summary Judgment is for.
Furthermore, even if it could be said that there were genuine issues of fact, they were
not issues regarding material facts. There is no dispute regarding the material facts.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANTING OF DEFENDANT HUGHES MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT WAS NOT IN ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THERE WERE NO GENUINE
ISSUES AS TO THE FACTS.

Plaintiff Meridian has pointed out three areas where it claims there were genuine issues
as to the facts. The first of these areas regards the conversation held on July 31, 1991 between
Meridian and Hughes.

The purported "genuine issue" is what exactly was said in that

conversation. The reality is that neither side can quote verbatim what was said, but can only
state what legal significance they attributed to the conversation. The only real facts provided
by either party are in total agreement. First, a conversation was held on July 31, 1992 between
Stewart Hughes and Meridian's registrar and in that conversation Hughes was instructed to write

a letter to the board of directors in order to withdraw the child from school. Just because each
party to the conversation attributed different legal significance to it does not create a genuine
issue in the facts.
The second point or area of "disputed facts" is really just a rehash of the first. There
is no dispute in the facts as to whether the registrar, Gale Wells, had authority to allow the child
to withdraw, she didn't. There is also no dispute as to whether Defendant Hughes believed that
Registrar Wells had the authority to allow a withdrawal, she did. Neither side is disputing what
the other side believed. The only dispute is the legal significance of the events. Just because
there was a mis-communication between the parties does not mean that there are disputed facts.
The last point or area of alleged disputed facts is whether Plaintiff Meridian sent
registration materials to Defendant Hughes. This also is not an area of disputed facts. In
Defendant Hughes Reply to Plaintiff Meridian's Motion for Summary Judgment, Hughes admits
that she received a packet of "registration materials", but merely believed that their child's name
had not yet been removed from Plaintiffs mailing list (R.162 and 152). Again, there are no
disputed facts, only differing opinions as to the legal significance of those facts.
In this case, the conduct of the parties is clear. Most of the communication between the
parties was by letter, copies of which were provided to the court. The fact that there was a
miscommunication is also clear. There is no genuine issue as to any facts, only differing
opinions as to the legal significance of the facts.
Plaintiff is correct in its assertation that summary judgment is not proper in a case with
basic unresolved issues, Sandberg v. Klein. 576 P.2d 1291, at 1294 (Utah 1978), however, such

is not the case in the present action. In this case the facts are clear, only the legal result is in
question

This case is very similar to Greer v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 674 P.2d 1257

(Wash. App. 1984), in which the court held that summary judgment is proper despite a
difference in opinion as to the legal effect of certain terms of a document. This is very
analogous to the present case. Here the conduct and beliefs of the parties are clear and
undisputed. It is purely a question of law to decide the legal consequences of the conduct and
beliefs.

II. EVEN IF PLAINTIFF MERIDIAN'S CLAMS OF DISPUTED FACTS WERE TRUE, THE FACTS
CLAIMED TO BE IN DISPUTE ARE NOT MATERIAL FACTS.

In Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp.. 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 1982), the court stated that,
"Mere existence of genuine issues of fact in the case as a whole does not preclude entry of
summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to the resolution of the case." See also Norton
v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983), Kesler v. Kesler, 583 P.2d 89 (Utah 1978). Such is
the instant case. Regardless of whether the claimed disputed facts are disputed or not, they are
not material facts.
On July 31, 1991, as instructed, Defendant Hughes sent a letter to the board of directors
indicating that they had decided to withdraw their daughter from the upcoming year. Meridian
did not make any reply to that letter until October 4, 1991, over two months later and a month
after school had begun.
Hughes thought that sending the letter was merely a formality and the matter was

finished.

If it was Meridian's policy to review each letter and make a decision regarding

whether or not to allow the student to withdraw, the burden was on their shoulders to reply in
a timely fashion. By not contacting Defendant Hughes in a timely manner, it may be interpreted
that Plaintiff Meridian acquiesced to the withdrawal. Regardless, as a matter of law under the
doctrines of laches, waiver, or estoppel, Meridian should be estopped from coming back later
and claiming that they had decided not to allow the child to withdraw, and had conveniently
forgot to inform Defendant Hughes until a month after school started and the child was already
well assimilated into a different class. The fact that Defendant Hughes later was willing to help
solve the problem and transfer the child to Meridian if Plaintiff Meridian would have been
willing to compromise is irrelevant. Plaintiff made the rules regarding withdrawal from school
after the contract deadline, but did not play by those rules and therefore, as a matter of law,
Meridian was correctly estopped by the trial court from changing their own rules.
What the Plaintiff Meridian refers to as "genuine issues" are not differences in facts or
content of communications, but merely differences in the "interpretation" of the legal
implications of those facts and communications. The court's finding in favor of Defendant was
proper under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
CONCLUSION
When the facts are considered in a light most favorable to Plaintiff Meridian, Defendant
Hughes is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Appellee respectfully requests
this court to affirm the Order granted below.
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Dated this
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., 1994

Respectfully Submitted

Daniel S. Sam
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
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ADDENDUM
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
The Meridian School Enrollment Contract
Letter from Stewart F. Hughes to Meridian School's Board of Trustees, dated
July 31, 1991
Letter from Paul A. Cox, Board of Trustees Chairman, to Mr. & Mrs. Stewart
Hughes, dated October 2, 1991

Rule 55

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must,
within two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included in the
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the
judgment docket.
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 1, 1985.)
Rule 55. Default.
(a) D e f a u l t
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear the cle^k
shall enter his default.
(2) Notice to party in default. After the
entry of the default of any party, as provided in
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or
in the event t h a t it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of
damages of the nondefaulting party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served
otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the
amount due and costs against the defendant, if
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if
he is not an infant or incompetent person.
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is
necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it
deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) J u d g m e n t against the state or officer or
a g e n c y thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
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ration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For d e f e n d i n g party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and t h a t the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which
the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the m a t t e r s stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, a n adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.
(f) When affidavits a r e unavailable. Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits m a d e in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
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ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments.
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953,
shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and
39. The existence of another adequate remedy does
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases
where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and
may advance it on the calendar.
Rule 58A. Entry.
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless
the court otherwise directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a
jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed.
If there is a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by
a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith
signed by the clerk and filed.
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided
in Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of
Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge
and filed with the clerk.
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judgment docket. A judgment is
complete and shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property,
when the same is signed and filed as herein above
provided. The clerk shall immediately make a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the
judgment docket.
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The
prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk
of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of
this provision.
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party
dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact
and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be
rendered thereon.
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is authorized by statute, the party
seeking the same must file with the clerk of the court
in which the judgment is to be entered a statement,
verified by the defendant, to the following effect:
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money
due or to become due, it shall concisely state the
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is
justly due or to become due;
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same;
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for
a specified sum.
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the judgment docket, a judgment
of the court for the amount confessed, with costs of
entry, if any.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.)

Rule 59

Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment.
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judgment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof,
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the
following manner: (1) by written instrument, duly acknowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by acknowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the
judgment in the county where first docketed, with the
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. Every satisfaction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming
them.
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judgment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of
record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall
have been lost, the court in which such judgment was
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof,
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered
upon the docket.
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case,
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also
enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, including the amount paid, on the margin of the judgment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfaction.
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall
have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any
judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon
the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the
extent of such satisfaction, be discharged and cease to
be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, if any execution shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such
execution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of
such partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to
collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from
the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon.
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other
counties. When any satisfaction of a judgment shall
have been entered on the judgment docket of the
county where such judgment was first docketed, a
certified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by
the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with
the clerk of the district court in any other county
where the judgment may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be
made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall
have the same effect as in the county where the same
was originally entered.
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61,
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a
new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,
and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or
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THE MERIDIAN SCHOOL ENROLLMENT CONTRACT: 1991-1992

\$

'

"he undersigned Parent/Guardian wishes to enroll the Student(s) listed in Part 1 below in the Meridian School (hereafter the School)
or the 1991-1992 academic year. The undersigned Parent/Guardian of the Student(s) agrees to pay the tuition payable and all (oes
nd to accept the terms of enrollment set forth in this Enrollment Contract.
. Student Names and Tuition Amounts
Tie table below summarizes tuition for the 1991-1992 academic year. The tuition in Grade 1 through 12 depends on the number of
Itudents enrolled from a family. Nursery and Kindergarten Student(s) do not count in computing the multi-student discount.

1.

Nursery and Kindergarten

Grades 1 Through 12

$1,100 Nursery Threes
$1,400 Nursery Fours
$1,700 Kindergarten

$2,850 First student from family
$2,500 Each 2nd and 3rd student
$2,100 Each 4th and 5th student
$1,800 Each subsequent student

STUDENTS FULL NAME

GRADE

TUITION

K

1700

Sarah Hughes

TOTAL TUITION
$1700
Z. Enrollment Deposit
To reserve a place for the Student(s) listed above Parent/Guardian must pay an immediate enrollment deposit of $100 per Student
jp to a maximum of $300 per family, which will be applied toward tuition. This deposit and any other tuition payments made prior
to July 1, 1991 will be refunded in full if this enrollment contract is cancelled prior to July 1, 1991, in writing, in accordance with
the notice provisions of paragraph 9.
3. Early Payment Discounts
To encourage early payment, the Meridian School offers early payment discounts for any and all payments received prior to Augustx
1, 1991. The table below gives the discount rate applicable in each month. These rates are equivalent to 1.5% for each month prior
to August 1991 plus an additional 1% in February.
Table of Early Payment Discounts
(For payments received on or before date shown)
FEB 7 MAR 7 APR 7 MAY 7 JUN 7 JUL 7
.100
.075
.060
.045
.030
.015

AUG 31
.000

4. Schedule of Minimum Payments and Finance Carrying Cost
At least one-fifth (20%) of total tuition payable is due in August and must be paid prior to August 31, 1991. No Student may
matriculate until this payment has been received by the School. Any balance outstanding on August 31, 1991 will be billed in equal
installments plus a financing charge that is 1.5% of the balance outstanding at the start of that month. The monthly statement will
give the minimum tuition payment required in that month, which is summarized in the table of minimum proportions of total tuition
that must be paid over time. If the minimum monthly payment is not received by the fifth of the month, a late fee of 3% of the
minimum payment will be charged.

AUG
.20

SEPT
.30

OCT
.40

NOV
.50

DEC
.60

JAN
.70

FEB
.80

MAR
.90

APRIL
i.00

Parents may pay off the tuition at a faster rate than the minimum and will thereby reduce the amount of monthly financing charge.

5. fees and Collection
In addition to tuition, Parent/Guardian agrees to pay all fees and charges billed by the School for textbooks, laboratory fees, special
field trips, and student supplies. Tuition and fees that are not paid when due shall bear interest from their due date until paid, at the
rate of 1.5% per month or fraction thereof. The School shall be entitled to recover ail costs of collection, including court costs and
reasonable attorney's fees. The School reserves the right (without prejudice to its rights to recover tuition and fees owed by the
Parent/Guardian) to deny any and all privileges of enrollment to the Sruden(s) in the event of non-payment, including the withholding
of progress reports and denial of access to classrooms and other facilities of the School.
6. Contract Cancellation by Parent/Guardian
The School and Parent/Guardian jointly acknowledge that by this enrollment, the School has reserved a place for the Student(s) in
the listed grades for the entire school year and that the School will enroll other Students and formulate its budget in reliance on this
Enrollment Contract.
This Enrollment Contract may be cancelled bv providing written notice to the School on or before July 1T 1991 in accordance with
the notice provisions in Paragraph 9. This Enrollment Contract also may be cancelled by the Parent/Guardian during the school year
if the family of the Student(s) relocates to an area outside Utah County by providing written notice in accordance with the notice
provisions of Paragraph 9. A pro rata share of tuition, but not fees, will be refunded to families who relocate. The basts for the pro
rata return will be the proportion of days reniaining in the school year to total days in the school year. In all cases, other than

moving out of Utah County and dismissal in accordance with the provisions in Paragraph 7, the obligation
ofParent/Guardian to pay tuition and fees for the entire school year is unconditional and irrevocable after
July 1, 1991, and no portion of tuition and fees shall be refunded or abated for any reason.
7. Rules of Disciplinary Action
Parent/Guardian agTees to abide by and to have their Students) abide by the rules, regulations, and procedures established by the
School and published from time to time, including the Parent Handbook. The School reserves the right to dismiss and remove a
Student from the School at any time if, in the judgment of the Head of School, a Student's industry, progress,, conduct or influence
in or out of the School is not in keeping with these rules, regulations, and procedures. If the School dismisses or removes a Student
from the School, a pro rata share of tuition, but not fees, will be refunded to the family of the Student. The basis for the pro rata
return will be the proportion of days remaining in the school year to total days in the school year.
8. Notices to Parent/Guardian from School
Bills for tuition and fees shall be sent by first class mail to Parent/Guardian at the address listed below. Notice of school meetings
shall be sent home by a designated Student from each family. Notice of disciplinary actions shall be sent by registered mail to the
address listed below.
9. Notice from Parent/Guardian to School
Notices of cancellation of this Enrollment Contract by Parent/Guardian shall be sent by registered mail to the Head of School,
Meridian School, 931 East 300 North, Provo, Utah 84606.
10. Nondisorimirratpry practice
The School doe^imr dicriminate on the basis of ra^er religion, gender, or national origin in the admissions, financial aid, or any
other program/administered by%e School.

Si^gnature: Head of School

JhtdJUfyk _.
Signature of Parent/Guardian

V?0\J\V>Ar C-

ftvC-H£^>

Date

Name of Parent/Guardian (Print)

$ 10?
Amount Address
Enclosed
Mailing

f-K-'H
Date

424 EAST CENTER
PROVO, UTAH 84606

July 31, 1991

Board of Trustees
Meridian School
931 East 300 North
Provo, Utah
Dear Board of Trustees:
My daughter, Sarah Hughes, was enrolled in your Nursery 4
program last year. We were \/ery pleased with her experience cmd
planned to enroll her in Kindergarten at Meridian this year.
However, since that time we have become aware of the changes
made in our local public school by the new principal, Kim Lang ton.
He has been able to hiro two additional teachers> build an extra
classroom and secure permission for a computer lab—things we h^ve
been trying to get for years.
Wu feel wo should support these
efforts in order to be a p^rt of the solution in public education.
I apologize for the late notice and a)iy inconvenience this
will cause.
I appreciate the positive experience Sarah had at
Meridian.

Sincerely ,

Stewart F. Hughes
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iLxin, MERIDIAN SCHOO
931 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 374-5480
October 2, 1991

Mr. & Mrs. Stewart Hughes
424 East Center
Provo, Ut 84606
Dear Mr. & Mrs. Hughes,
The Board of Trustees met on August 22, 1991, to discuss the withdrawal of students
from the school after July 1, 1991, the deadline set forth in the enrollment contract. Each case
was reviewed individually. The Board concluded that the provisions for timely withdrawal in
the enrollment contract are clear and that your breach of these provisions could place the school
in considerable financial difficulty. The school depends on the information in the enrollment
contracts to hire faculty, arrange classroom space, and purchase materials for the coming year.
The Board was informed by legal counsel that the enrollment contract is enforceable
according to its terms. The Board decided to enforce the contents of Paragraph 6 of the
Meridian School Enrollment Contract: 1991-1992. The first collection case was heard by
Honorable Robert Sumsion in the Fourth Circuit Court on September 25, 1991. The court
granted a judgement in Meridian's favor, including the balance owed, accrued interest, and all
court costs.
Paragraph 6 requires that in all cases, other than moving out of Utah County and
dismissal in accordance with the provisions in Paragraph 7, the obligation of the Parent/Guardian
to pay tuition and fees for the entire school year is unconditional and irrevocable after July 1,
1991, and no portion of tuition and fees shall be refunded or abated for any reason.
We regret the situation in which you and we find ourselves. The existence and the
efficient operation of the school, however, depend on the commitments, legal and otherwise, of
parents and necessitate the action the Board has unanimously agreed to take.
Sincerely,

Paul A. Cox
Chairman, Board of Trustees
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